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Abstract 
We provide here a thermodynamic analog of the Braess road-network paradox with 
irreversible engines working between reservoirs that are placed at vertices of the network. 
Paradoxes of different kinds reappear, emphasizing the specialty of the network. 
 
1. Introduction 
 The Braess paradox (BP) [1] for a road network, to state in terms of a very simple 
case, concerns the inflow of cars from point 1 and outflow through point 4 (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The basic network where path 23 is the extra path.  
 
The pair of roads 12 and 34 has similar characteristics, so is true of the other pair 24 and 
13. Cars (C) can go through roads 124 and 134. When points 2 and 3 are joined by 
another possible path, to be henceforth called the extra path (EP), cars have more 
freedom. But, it has been shown that this freedom may lead to increased cost in certain 
situations, contrary to common sense. Note that the conventional belief is, freedom is 
always an advantage. This maxim is shattered here, rather surprisingly. And, that’s why, 
it is paradoxical. In summary, addition of an extra route within a network may not be 
profitable. 
With reference to the above figure, let us analyze the various possibilities to check  
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when and how such a paradox might emerge. To proceed, we need to define a 
characteristic time (τ) for each path.  There exist several options. We stick to one popular 
set, where τ1 = C/100, τ2 = 45 and τ3 = 1, in some unit of time (say, minute). Such a 
choice implies, roads 12 and 34 are substantially narrower. Thus, jamming would cost a 
longer time as more cars pass through them. The other pair of routes is sufficiently wider, 
but longer too, to allow (within limits) the passage of any number of cars at fixed times. 
Path 23 (the EP), on the other hand, is widest and shortest. The standard choice is to take 
4000 total cars (CT = 4000) to illustrate the problem. There are two possibilities. A driver 
may exercise his own choice of route, with or without any knowledge of what others are 
doing; we call it the user-optimized (UO) travel. Otherwise, the choice is dictated by the 
traffic administration, keeping explicit records (with automatic display) of the number of 
cars entering and leaving a particular path so as to minimize the travel time, and this is 
termed as the system-optimized (SO) scheme. To succinctly present the paradox, we now 
consider Table 1 where results of sticking to several alternative routes are displayed. 
Our starting premise is again the popular choice of CT = 4000, but we also vary 
the number to notice certain other effects. A glance at Table 1 reveals the following:  
 
Table 1. Illustration of the Braess paradox. Here CT and τT refer respectively to the total number of 
cars and the total time required. Cij defines the number of cars along a path ij. System-optimized 
(SO) cases are distinguished from user-optimized (UO) ones. Characteristic times (τ) for the paths 
are defined in the text. Nash equilibrium (NE) prevails in all the cases. 
CT C12 C13 C23 C24 C34 C123 C124 C134 C1234 τT Remark 
4000 
4000 
4000 
2000 
2000 
6000 
6000 
4400 
4400 
2000 
4000 
2200 
1000 
2000 
3000 
2200 
2200 
2200 
2000 
0 
1800 
1000 
0 
3000 
3800 
2200 
2200 
0 
4000 
2200 
0 
2000 
0 
2200 
0 
2200 
2000 
0 
0 
1000 
0 
3000 
0 
2200 
0 
2000 
4000 
4000 
1000 
2000 
3000 
6000 
2200 
4400 
0 
4000 
2200 
0 
2000 
0 
2200 
0 
2200 
2000 
0 
0 
1000 
0 
3000 
0 
2200 
0 
2000 
0 
1800 
1000 
0 
3000 
3800 
2200 
2200 
0 
4000 
2200 
0 
2000 
0 
2200 
0 
2200 
65 
81 
63 
55 
41 
75 
83 
67 
67 
SO, NE 
UO, NE 
SO, NE 
SO, NE 
SO, UO, NE 
SO, NE 
UO, NE 
SO, NE 
SO, UO, NE 
 
(i) When the EP 23 is absent, the first row shows how an intelligent system can optimize 
the ‘cost’ τT. Any other choice would only increase the overall cost for all the cars. 
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(ii) If the EP is operative, the drivers might follow a simpler logic of lessening the cost by 
choosing the route 123 instead of the direct path 13. Results are shown in the second row, 
and one may wonder that this leads finally to a loss (compare against the first row). Here 
we witness the impact of the paradox. 
(iii) The system may still try to optimize, and it can do so by following the third row of 
Table 1, i.e., allowing 2200 cars to go through path 1234 in a time τ ≤ τ2. This provides 
the 1800 cars at point 3 (after τ2) a decisive advantage of far less crowding as they cross 
the path 34. Such a tactic is never emphasized, but it is surely admissible. 
(iv) The EP may always be profitable with lesser total cars. The fourth and fifth rows 
testify this fact. Further, the UO and SO become equivalent in this case. 
(v) However, with much larger CT, even the new trick of the SO scheme (cf. the third 
row) would cease to work. This is clear from the results displayed in the last two rows. 
Here, the BP is operative in full glory. Thus, along with τ for the different paths, CT plays 
a crucial role. 
(vi) Rows 8 and 9 reveal the limiting value of CT beyond which BP shows up.  
The above table also highlights the importance of flux. Note that, of all the cases 
under consideration here, the flux is maximum at the sixth row and, therefore, the BP is 
very relevant to transportation science in complex road networks. Particularly if the flux 
is large, EP becomes uneconomic. Further, if the system does not properly manage, the 
EP may cause serious traffic jams. The added flexibility (EP 23) thus acts adversely. It is 
in such a situation that its construction becomes questionable [2]! Let us note in passing 
that, only for small CT [like 2200 or less], the route 1234 is rewarding, and the more so in 
terms of flux as CT increases from its minimum possible value of unity. 
A related concept in the above issue is the Nash equilibrium (NE) [3]. It says that, 
when such an equilibrium exists, one cannot gain in cost (i.e., lessen the travel time) by 
adopting a different route, knowing others’ strategies. As noted in Table 1, the NE is 
always valid in all the suggested moves with well-defined number of cars (CT). 
The BP stimulated a lot of further works (see, e.g., [4-8] and references quoted 
therein). While road networks had been the prime concern [4], other types of networks 
[5], including chemical ones [6], have also shown its importance. Transport in 
nanostructures [7] and epidemiology [8] also highlighted some relevance of the BP.  
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Having understood the nature of the paradox, let us emphasize now that the 
network depicted in Figure 1 is itself a very special one. Thus, paradoxes akin to the BP 
may arise in other areas too. As a test case, we expound here a thermodynamic parallel. 
2. A thermodynamic network 
To proceed, we consider 4 reservoirs, to be designated as 1, 2, 3 and 4, kept at 
temperatures T1 > T2 > T3 > T4. Let us choose also 4 irreversible engines (ηk < ηCE), each 
working between 2 such reservoirs with a given efficiency, as shown in Figure 2. 
Efficiency ηCE refers to the Carnot engine (CE) acting between the corresponding 
reservoirs. The symmetry in efficiencies is deliberate, so also the arrangement (see, e.g.  
Figure 1). The source is at the left (T1) and the sink is at the right (T4). The other two 
reservoirs act merely as intermediate-temperature ones that finally do not gain or lose any 
heat. Thus, they do not contribute to the overall entropy change. 
The idea has its origin in the following argument. Suppose we have two reservoirs 
at T1 and T4, and an engine operates between them with a fixed efficiency η1, much less 
than the Carnot efficiency. Then, the work obtainable is also η1 per unit amount of heat 
taken from the source. Had it been replaced by another engine of efficiency η2, work 
would be just η2. But, if we insert a third intermediate-temperature reservoir (T2), which  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A network of reservoirs connected by irreversible engines.  
 
does not take up or lose any heat in a cycle, and allow both the engines to operate (path 
124), satisfying ηk < ηCE, but keeping the efficiencies same as before, work W (see below) 
becomes greater. Within limits of ηk < ηCE, the temperature of this third reservoir does not 
influence W. So, we add another such reservoir at T3 (path 134) and allow alterations of 
the two engines to check the outcomes. As we now have two intermediate reservoirs at 
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different temperatures, it is also tempting to connect them by another engine. The whole 
arrangement thus follows. The physical connotation is different here, but the resemblance 
with Figure 1 is immediate. Anyway, let us now proceed to the cost estimates. Cost may 
be defined here as the inverse of work, since we like to extract maximum work; the cost is 
thus minimized. 
There is one more difference. Whereas in the original road network, we varied the 
number of cars (equivalently, the flux), here we vary the efficiencies of the engines. The 
chief aim remains same, however, viz., the cost-effectiveness. 
Assume, as stated earlier, that the heat taken from the source is unity. One may 
check that the following results for work W then emerge (paths are denoted by 
temperature subscripts): 
A: Path 124 
     124 1 1 2(1 ) .W W         (1) 
B: Path 134 
     134 2 2 1(1 ) .W W         (2) 
C: Path 124 + Path 134  
  124 134 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
.
W x x x x
W
1     
  
        
      (3) 
In (3), by our choice, x1 fraction of heat flows through path 124, but x1 does not have any 
effect on the net work finally. Thus, cases A, B and C yield the same work. In other 
words, there is no gain in terms of work. As a result, we have the first paradox, very 
similar to the BP in spirit: 
Paradox 1: Addition of a freedom may not always be profitable. 
In the above statement, we mean by ‘freedom’ the path 134 that is added here to the 
existing path 124. This forms the simplest network. But, it has not turned out to be useful 
because the effective efficiencies along both the paths are same, and the total heat is 
apportioned between the routes. Hence, one of the intermediate-temperature reservoirs 
seems now redundant. However, we are now close to another more serious paradox. 
Paradox 2: How does one know that all the engines are functional? 
This problem arises because, it is not known for sure that all cases A, B and C are active 
simultaneously. For example, it may well occur that the engines along paths 13 and 34 
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remain idle throughout (i.e., x1 = 1, by choice). There is no theoretical principle to refute 
this possibility. Similarly, x1 = 0 would mean that the other two engines choose to stay 
inactive. We notice that our stress on the specialty of the network in Figure 1 has now 
found some significance once one appreciates this second paradox. 
To continue further, we insert an extra engine between T2 and T3. In presence of 
this extra path (EP), we have one more possibility, as summarized below: 
D: Path 1234 
1234 1 1 3 1 3 1
1 1 3 1 2
1
(1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 )[ (1 ) ]
(1 ) .
W
W
W
     
    
 
     
     
   
   (4) 
Here, the term within the bracket at the right side of the second line is designated by Δ. 
It is the difference in work of paths 123 and 13. This difference in cost was central to the 
original paradox as well [see point (ii) below Table 1]. Result (4) shows that (a) Δ = 0 
refers to something similar to an equilibrium situation where cases A, B, C and D act 
equivalently, (b) Δ  > 0 sets a preference of case D over the other three in respect of 
available work, (c) case D involves a larger entropy change for Δ  < 0, rendering less 
work, and (d) a sufficient condition for Δ  > 0 is to ensure 2 ≤ 1, while 2 > 1 is a 
necessary condition for Δ  < 0. 
 One may ascertain easily that all the above situations are permissible. Indeed, 
Table 2 summarizes such cases for specific choices of the temperatures of reservoirs and 
efficiencies of engines attached, as per the construction of Figure 3. Such efficiencies are 
all less than the corresponding Carnot efficiencies to guarantee their irreversible 
characters. Note that the sample values of k in Table 2 are purely  arbitrary; there  exists   
 
Table 2. Typical cases of positive, negative and zero Δ. 
T1 T2 T3 T4 1 2 3 Δ 
400 
400 
400 
200 
200 
200 
100 
100 
100 
50 
50 
50 
1/4 
1/10 
1/10 
1/6 
1/3 
1/4 
1/3 
1/6 
1/6 
1/3 
-1/12 
0 
 
countless of possibilities (within limits, of course) yielding positive, negative or zero Δ.  
 6
For example, at fixed 3 = 4/9, these requirements may be fulfilled over a wide range of 
2 and 1, as displayed in Figure 4. The guiding relation in this regard is (4). We also see 
that points on the boundary correspond to Δ = 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.00
0.15
0.30
0.45
0.60
0.75
0.00
0.15
0.30
0.45
0.60
0.75
 > 0
 < 0
 2
 
 
1
Figure 3. Boundary separating Δ > 0 and Δ < 0 at 3 = 4/9. 
 
Assume further now that all paths are allowed, including the EP. Suppose x2 
fraction of heat gained by reservoir 2 goes along the 24 path. We then have the following 
result after some simplification: 
   1 2 1 1 3 1 2(1 )(1 )[ (1 ) ]EPW W x x .             (5) 
It shows that the work is now different in presence of the EP. Rewriting (5) as 
1 2 1(1 )(1 ) ,EPW W x x              (6) 
one finds again three distinct situations with positive, negative and zero Δ. 
 Collecting all the above results, with the restrictions about the efficiencies, the 
arrangements and role of the intermediate reservoirs, we now come to certain additional 
interesting conclusions.  
Let us start with the case of Δ  = 0. This is going to be certainly fruitless because 
here one does not gain at all: 
     1234EPW W W  .     (7) 
On the other hand, Δ > 0 case seems to be most favorable, yielding from (4) and (6) 
         (8) 1234 .EPW W W 
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Similarly, when Δ < 0, one is led to 
     1234 .EPW W W      (9) 
Indeed, the equality is achieved only when x1 = 1 and x2 = 0, which means 
that the two routes become identical. Note, however, that (6) generally contains two 
unknown variables x1 and x2 for any Δ ≠ 0. In order to get rid of these variables, one 
may choose to put in (6) the ‘average estimates’ of x1 and x2. If we take an assembly of 
the set-up as in Figure 2, such an averaging becomes meaningful because both the 
variables are allowed to take random values between 0 and 1. We thus have 
1234EPW W
    1 14 (1 ) .EPW W          (10) 
Some more paradoxical situations are now in order: 
Paradox 3: When Δ = 0, how does one know that all cases A, B, C and D are active, 
and hence all the engines are again functional? 
This is similar to the second paradox, but it now includes path 1234. To appreciate the 
extension, notice that the inclusion of x2, and hence the possibility of its being zero or 
unity, adds to confusion. Again, one wonders if there exists any guiding principle in this 
regard. 
Paradox 4: If Δ > 0, is it guaranteed that case D will be followed to offer maximum 
work?   
One might have expected this answer in the affirmative. But, there are two immediate 
objections in view of (8) and (10). Additionally, the problem may be even more 
deceptive. We know that a process with larger increase in entropy is more probable. So, 
if flexibility exists, nature will try to gain the maximum profit out of it by maximizing the 
entropy of the surroundings. Therefore, WEP will indeed try to be a minimum. (As W does 
not have any freedom, it remains a constant, anyway.) In other words, the Δ  > 0 case 
will avoid the 23 path fully (x1 = 0 or x2 = 1) to meet the equality. On the other hand, for 
Δ  < 0, the wisest choice would be x1 = 1 and x2 = 0 so as to depart most from the 
equality. Here, the EP incurs a real loss! This is closest in spirit to the Braess’ paradox. In 
a thermodynamic context, we thus see that, in place of the system, the surroundings 
would take advantage of the extra freedom. So, when Δ  > 0 and we like to exploit the 
profit, the network needs to be broken in the way shown in Figure 4. This ensures only 
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case D to act. 
 
   Figure 4. Part of the network for profitable use when Δ  > 0. 
3. Conclusion 
In summary, the analogy with a flow system, as prevalent in a road network, 
follows as soon as we define that unit amount of heat is released from the source per unit 
time in our given arrangement. Then, of course, the work will be replaced by power, but 
all our above statements will be valid. Finally, Δ = 0 if all the engines are CE, and hence 
no paradox would arise. 
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